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L Introduction
Imagine the following hypothetical: In 1959, Ms. Bums bequeathed to the
Springfield Museum of Modem Art her collection of European Secessionist art
from the early 1900s. In 1959, Springfield was a growing city that provided
ample funding for its various culture and arts venues. Since that time, the
economy of Springfield has become increasingly depressed, forcing the city to
withdraw almost all funding for its museums and libraries. In the meantime,
the value of Ms. Bums' art has skyrocketed and is the centerpiece of the
museum's collection. The museum's operating budget barely meets basic
operating expenses, leaving no funds for the restoration needed for some of the
more valuable Secessionist pieces. As a result, many of the earliest and most
valuable pieces are kept in storage to prevent further deterioration. In an effort
to focus its collection and increase its public visibility, the museum would like
to sell the later Secessionist pieces and use the proceeds to restore the earlier
ones. If the sale occurs, the museum will have the most unified collection of
early Secessionist art in the United States. The problem is that Ms. Bums'
donation expressly restricted the sale of any of the works. According to the gift
instrument, the Springfield Museum must hold the works in perpetuity. This
scenario illustrates the problems facing both small and large museums across
the country. Although it would not completely resolve the problem, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) should address the problem in this situation by
using deduction valuation procedures at the time of the original donation to
discourage restrictions on the alienability of donations to museums.

TAX VALUATION OF GIFTS TO ART MUSEUMS
Most art museums' operate as either charitable trusts 2 or nonprofit

corporations. 3 With either organizational structure, the museum has a duty to
provide a social benefit to the public at large or a reasonably large class thereof.
This Note concerns only publicly supported tax-exempt art museums organized
as either charitable trusts or nonprofit corporations. These museums have been
determined by the IRS to be tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 4 and have
demonstrated that they receive a substantial part of their support from
governmental units and the general public.5 Funding for these museums comes6
from private donations, grants, and limited revenue-producing activities.
Further, the collections of these museums are largely dependent on donations.7
Like the hypothetical Springfield museum, many museums are rich in
assets 8 but struggle to meet basic financial needs for operational expenses. 9
One way that museums deal with this problem is through deaccessioningl°
either to acquire new assets or to meet operational expenses. Recent trends in
the museum profession also lead museums to deaccession. Museums are
generally becoming more focused in their collecting and are less likely to keep

1. An art museum is defined generally as "a permanent, not-for-profit institution,
essentially educational and humanistic in purpose, that studies and cares for works of art and on
some regular schedule exhibits and interprets them to the public." ASS'NOFARTMUSEUMDIR.,
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS 6 (2001).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959) (defining charitable trust as a
fiduciary duty subjecting the trustees to the equitable duty of maintaining the property for a
charitable purpose).
3. See MARIE C. MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 5
(1998) (defining a nonprofit corporation or a charitable corporation as an organization
established in a corporate form for the pursuit of a charitable purpose or purposes) [hereinafter
MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER]. Most museums are operated as nonprofit corporations. Id. at 4.
4. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
5. See MALARo, A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 3, at 370 (describing the IRS requirements
for publicly supported tax-exempt art museums).
6. See Marie C. Malaro, Deaccessioning: The American Perspective, 10 MUSEUM
MGMT. & CURATORSHIP 273,274 (1991) [hereinafter Malaro, Deaccessioning](describing how
museums in the United States get funding).
7. See id. (stating that it is estimated that over 90% of the objects in United States
museums have been donated); see also MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 3, at 61
("Without tax incentives and generous donations, museums could not flourish.").
8. See STEPHEN E. WELL, A CABINET OF CURIOSITIES: INQUIRIES INTO MUSEUMS AND
THEIR PROSPECTS 140 (1995) [hereinafter WELL, A CABINET OF CURIOSITIES] (estimating the
potential aggregate value of the collections of United States art museums).
9. See id. (noting that because museums are under pressure to fully expend their
resources during each fiscal year, they operate near the edge of their available resources).
10. See Malaro, Deaccessioning, supra note 6, at 273 (defining deaccessioning as "the
permanent removal of an object that was once accessioned into a museum's collection").
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objects that are extraneous to their mission.11 In addition, because of increased
knowledge and heightened regard for the importance of proper storage and
conservation combined with the cost of those activities, 12 museums are more
likely to deaccession objects that are not clearly furthering the museum's
mission. 13
Two standards guide museum professionals in making
deaccessioning decisions. First, the legal standard sets the floor by determining
when deaccessioning is and is not allowed. 14 Next, the professional ethics
5
standard defines when deaccessioning should occur.1
Museums may encounter a number of difficulties in trying to deaccession
a donated work of art. The legal standard for permissible deaccessioning is
generally determined with reference to the method of acquisition. 16 If the
pieces were acquired by gift and if the donor imposed a restriction on the
alienability of the gift, either by requiring that the museum keep or display the
piece in perpetuity or affirmatively denying the museum the right to sell the
piece, the museum has a duty to abide by the donor's wishes. 17 Despite a
contrary agreement with the donor, however, a court in equity can allow a
museum to sell the object by reforming the gift instrument under the doctrine of
cy pres. 8 On the other hand, the court may refuse to allow the sale despite the
judgment of the museum professionals. 19

11.
12.

Id. at 276.
In 1988, the average annual cost of keeping an object in storage was estimated to be

$30 per square foot. STEPHEN E. WEIL MAKING MUSEUMS MATTER 141, 142 (2002).
13. Malaro, Deaccessioning, supra note 6, at 276.
14. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing potential legal challenges to a museum's decision to
deaccession a restricted gift of art).
15.

See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS, CODE OFETHICS FOR MUSEUMS 8-9 (2000)

("Proceeds from the sale of nonliving collections are to be used consistent with the established
standards of the museum's discipline, but in no event shall they be used for anything other than
acquisition or direct care of collections."); AS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIR., supra note 1, at 11
("The funds ... received from the disposal of any deaccessioned work of art must be used only
for the acquisition of works of art."); WEiL, A CABINET OF CURIOSITIES, supranote 8, at 139-43
(arguing that the use of deaccessioning proceeds to fund a museum's operating expenses is a
self-defeating policy).
16. While acknowledging public controversies regarding deaccessioning decisions,
Malaro states that she does not believe that there will be legislation banning deaccessioning.
Malaro, Deaccessioning, supra note 6, at 276. She instead advocates careful adherence to
professional codes of ethics among museums. Id. at 278-79.
17. See infra Part V.B.3 (discussing the fiduciary duties of museum trustees and
directors).
18. See infra Part VB.2 (discussing the use of the cy pres doctrine).
19. See, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts v. Beland, 735 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (Mass. 2000)
(refusing to allow the museum to sell seventeen paintings, only three of which were exhibited,
because of the donor's requirement that the paintings be permanently and inalienably given to

TAX VALUATION OF GIFTS TO ART MUSEUMS
Even if the museum ultimately prevails under a cy pres decision, doing so
requires considerable time and effort in pursuit of its professional goals. While
acknowledging and appreciating the support of museum donors, it is also
important to recognize the difficulties museums may encounter as a result of
donations encumbered by restrictions on the museum's ability to deaccession.
Because of these difficulties, such donations should be discouraged and
unrestricted donations should be encouraged. One way of effecting this policy
approach is through the tax system. The donations discussed in this Note are
deductible under the federal income, gift, and estate tax regimes.20 The IRS has
taken the position that despite the fact that the museum may be bound by the
inalienability terms of the gift instrument, it will allow the donor a full fair
market value deduction for the piece. 2' The general policy behind the
allowance of a charitable deduction in these circumstances, however, is to
encourage public support of charitable institutions.2 2 In light of that policy
rationale, the IRS should base deduction valuations on what the museum
receives and not the value the donor has given. Therefore, when a donor
donates a piece of art to a museum with a restriction on the museum's ability to
sell the art in the future the IRS should require the donor to depress the value of
her charitable deduction. To the extent that the donor makes decisions with an
eye toward tax savings, such a policy would provide a disincentive for these
types of restrictions and encourage less restricted giving. On the other hand,
should the donor go ahead with the restriction, and should the museum accept
the gift, 23 the donor's resolve regarding the restrictions would have been tested,
leaving less ambiguity in future situations that require the court24 or the
museum's trustees or directors 25 to conjure the donor's intent.
the museum).
20. See infra Part II (discussing the charitable deduction allowed by the three federal tax
regimes).
21. See infra Part II.E (discussing the recent private letter rulings issued by the IRS with
regard to charitable donations of art).
22. See infra Part V (discussing the policies supporting the deductibility of charitable
gifts).
23. See generally Marie C. Malaro, RestrictedGifts and Museum Responsibilities, 18 J.
ARTS MGMT & L., Fall 1988, at 41 [hereinafter Malaro, Restricted Gifts] (arguing that museums
should not accept gifts with restrictions on alienability); Robert J. Vanni, Deeds of Gift:
Caressing the Hand That Feeds, in LIBRARIES, MUSEUMS, AND ARCHIVEs 1, 9 (Thomas A.

Lipinski ed., 2002) (advising that museums be wary of accepting restricted gifts, stating
"Perpetuity is a long time! Collection policy may change, buildings may be demolished,
community use or expectations may change").
24. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the use of the cy pres doctrine).
25. See infra Part V.B.3 (discussing the fiduciary obligations of these officers with regard
to upholding the terms of the gift).
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Part II explores the legal requirements of charitable deductions of art
under current tax law and discusses the IRS's interpretation of these
requirements as failing to provide for or require a depressed fair market value
for restricted gifts. Part HI proposes a change in IRS policy in keeping with the
purpose behind the charitable deduction. Part IV outlines the legal effects of
the proposed change on the taxation of charitable giving. Finally, Part V
addresses the benefits and drawbacks of the proposal.
I. The Legal Requirements of CharitableDeductions
A. The Threshold Requirementfor Fee Simple Defeasible Interests
Charitable deductions for transfers of art to qualified museums 26 are
generally allowed for income, gift, and estate taxes under I.R.C. §§ 170, 2522,
and 2055, respectively.2 7 An initial requirement, however, may affect the
deductibility of restricted gifts and bequests of art to museums.28 Fee simple
defeasible gifts 29 are subject to special rules for charitable deductions under the
Treasury Regulations for income, gift, and estate tax charitable deductions.3 °
The language of the gift and estate tax regulations generally tracks the language
of the income tax regulation as follows:

26. To qualify for a charitable deduction under income, gift, or estate tax laws, a transfer
must be made to a qualified charitable organization as defined in I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B),
2055(a)(2), and 2522(a)(2) respectively. This Note covers only gifts made to museums meeting
these qualifications.
27. See I.R.C. § 170 (providing for charitable deductions from income); id. § 2055
(providing for the deduction of charitable contributions from the value of the taxable estate); id.
§ 2522 (providing for the deduction of charitable contributions from taxable gifts).
28. The Treasury Regulations for income, gift, and estate taxes provide that, for gifts
given with a condition subsequent, a charitable deduction is only allowed when the possibility
of the failure of the first interest is so remote as to be negligible. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A- I(e)
(disallowing a charitable deduction unless the chance of the gift failing is negligible); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (disallowing a charitable deduction unless the chance of the gift failing is
negligible); Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1) (disallowing a charitable deduction unless the
chance of the gift failing is negligible).
29. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 16 (1936) (defining a fee simple defeasible as a
fee simple estate that is "subject to a special limitation ... a condition subsequent... an
executory limitation.., or a combination of such restrictions").
30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(e) (providing deduction rules for gifts subject to a
condition subsequent); Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (providing deduction rules for gifts subject
to a condition subsequent); Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1) (providing deduction rules for gifts
subject to a condition subsequent).

TAX VALUATION OF GIFTS TO ART MUSEUMS
If an interest in property passes to, or is vested in, charity on the date of the
gift and the interest would be defeated by a subsequent performance of
some act or the happening of some event, the possibility of occurrence of
which appears on the date
of the gift to be so remote as to be negligible, the
31
deduction is allowable.
Two ambiguities arise regarding the construction of this regulation. The
first is whether the threshold requirement applies equally to transfers in which
in the event of a failure of the first interest the gift would revert to the grantor
or the grantor's successors or another noncharitable party and transfers that
provide for a gift-over to another charitable institution. 32 The IRS has taken the
position that this requirement applies only to the former, and donations with a
gift-over to charity in the event of the failure are considered complete charitable
33
donations.
Second, for transfers that could pass to a noncharitable party in the event
of a failure of the first interest, the IRS must determine whether the failure of a
particular transfer is so remote as to be negligible. In making determinations
under this standard, the IRS has cited courts' interpretations of the standard.34
Despite these general guidelines, the deductibility of any particular gift that
provides for a gift-over to a noncharitable interest is dependent on an
examination of the facts of a specific gift or bequest. 35 A detailed discussion of
what types of restrictions would pass the "so remote as to be negligible" test is

31. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(e). The language of the gift and estate tax regulations refer to
an estate or interest rather than an interest and change the tenses of the verbs in the sentence.
See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2055-2(b) (restating the operative principles found in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-l(e)), 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1) (restating the operative principles found in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1(e)). The estate tax regulation replaces date of the gift with at the time of the
decedent's death in two instances. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b). The gift tax regulations omit
"subsequent." Treas. Reg. § 25.222(c)-3.
32. The importance in the distinction turns on the determination of who is ultimately
guaranteed to receive the gift. In the former instance, if the first interest fails, the gift will pass
out of charity and to a private party.
33. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-014 (June 7, 2002) (finding that the requirements of
Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1) were satisfied because under no circumstances would the
artwork pass to a noncharitable interest); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-27-047 (July 5, 1991) (finding that a
restricted bequest was deductible because, at the time of the decedent's death, "there was no
more than a remote, negligible possibility that the bequest might not be used for [charitable]
purposes").
34. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993) (defining "so remote as to be negligible"
as a "chance which persons generally would disregard as so highly improbable that it might be
ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction") (citing United
States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1955)).
35. See Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-1 C.B. 594 (providing examples of factual scenarios in
which the deduction would and would not be disallowed).
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beyond the scope of this Note; 36 however, it is useful to consider examples of
restricted gifts that the IRS has stated would and would not pass the test.
In a recent Revenue Ruling, the IRS provided an example of the type of
contribution that would be disallowed because of a possible failure. 37 In this
ruling, the IRS determined that a gift in which a donor gives a patent to a
university so long as a specific professor remains employed at the university
would not be deductible under I.R.C. § 170 because the possibility that the
faculty member would cease to be employed by the university before the end of
the patent period was not so remote as to be negligible.38 In comparison, the
IRS allowed a full fair market value deduction for gifts of art to a museum
where the donor and the donor's children retained a possibility of reverter
should the museum fail to comply with the gift conditions. 39 The conditions on
that gift provided that the museum would be required to display the works
continuously and that the donor and the donor's children would have final
display control rights over all exhibitions of the work. 40 The IRS determined
that because the donor's display control rights were subject to a good museum
practice standard and because the instrument provided for arbitration in the
event of a breach of the gift conditions, the possibility of failure was so remote
as to be negligible, and it allowed the full fair market value deduction. 41 The
IRS does not provide a detailed analysis of the differences between the two fact
patterns; however, a key distinction between the two situations is that in the
first, the donee and the professor retain control over whether the gift will fail,
while in the second the courts are specifically assigned the duty of arbitrating
any potential failure.
B. FairMarket Value and CharitableDeductions
Assuming that the restrictions on the gift or bequest do not prevent the
charitable deduction, the fair market value of the art on the date of the transfer
determines the value of the transferred property.42 Fair market value is defined
36. In researching this Note, I have found no examples of proposed gifts to art museums
in which the IRS disallowed the deduction because of the possibility of failure of the first
interest.
37. Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-1 C.B. 594.
38. Id.
39. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(1) (stating that fair market value is used to determine
the amount of charitable deduction for gifts of property). Treasury Regulation § 20.2055-1 (a)

TAX VALUATION OF GIFTS TO ART MUSEUMS
as "the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts., 43 The definition of fair
market value provided in the regulations suggests that any restriction on future
alienability should be considered in valuation. 44 As John Sare has pointed out,
the requirement that the hypothetical buyer and seller in the exchange have
"reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts" supports the position that restricted
gifts should be given a lower value than unrestricted gifts. 45 In the open market,

the fact that the Springfield museum could not sell any of Ms. Bums' donations
would affect the price that the museum would pay for the pieces. Especially
given the current deaccessioning and focused collecting trends in the museum
profession, 46 any restriction on the alienability of a donated piece affects the value
of that piece for the museum.
C. Substantiationand AppraisalRequirements
The existing substantiation requirements for noncash charitable
contributions of property also suggest that the donor should consider restrictions
states that a deduction is allowable under I.R.C. § 2055 for the value of the property included in
the decedent's estate that passes to qualified charities. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1(a) (as amended
in 1990). The value of property in the decedent's estate is determined by the fair market value
at the time of the decedent's death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (as amended in 1965). The IRS
takes the position that the amount of such a deduction from the decedent's estate is also
determined by the fair market value of the property. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-18-002 (Apr. 30,
2004). Similarly, Treasury Regulation § 25.2512-1 requires that fair market value be used to
determine the value of any gift passing from the donor. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in
1992). From that gift tax, I.R.C. § 2522 allows a deduction for the amount of gifts made to
charity. I.R.C. § 2522 (2000). The IRS takes the position that the gift tax deduction is likewise
determined by the fair market value of the gift passing from the donor to charity. See Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993) (allowing a full fair market value deduction because donor's
retained rights were of no value).
43. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-1(c)(2), 20.2031-1(b), and 25.2512-1.
44. In researching this note, I have not found any situation in which I.R.C. § 2703 has
been applied to charitable deductions. I.R.C. § 2703 (2000). This provision states that for
purposes of estate and gift tax valuation, any restrictions on the power of alienation should be
ignored. Id. § 2703(a)(2). The provision is applied most often to the division of a closely held
business among family members. See JOHN BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION

6.04[2][a]

(1996) (discussing the application of § 2703).
45. John Sare, Art for Whose Sake? An Anaylsis of Restricted Gifts to Museums, 13
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 377, 390-91 (1989) (quoting Treas. Reg. 1.170A- 1(c)); see also id.
(arguing that the restrictions placed on a gift should be considered as relevant facts when
determining fair market value).
46. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing museum deaccessioning).
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on alienability in the valuation of donated property. If the claimed value of the
contribution is greater than $500, for income tax purposes, the donor must file
Form 8283.48 The form requires that the donor attach a statement of any
conditions attached to the contributions. 49 The form specifies that the donor must
divulge permanent or temporary restriction on the donee's fight to use or dispose
of the donated property.f0 The IRS further requires that any donation for which
the taxpayer claims a deduction greater than $5,000 must be supported by a
qualified appraisal. 5' The appraisal must include "all the facts on which to base
an intelligent judgment of the value of the property. 5 2 The instructions go on to
specify that a qualified appraisal must include the terms of the agreement between
the buyer and the seller that relate to "the use, sale, or other disposition of the
donated property.0 3 The IRS is also explicit that it does not accept appraisals
without question and that the taxpayer is responsible for supporting the fair
market value of the donated property. Given the attention paid to the terms of
any donation and especially the particular requirement that the donor divulge any
restrictions on the donee's rights of use or alienability, the IRS substantiation
procedures implicitly suggest that such limitations are to be taken into account in
determining the deductible amount.
D. Tax Court Interpretationsof FairMarket Value of Restricted Gifts ofArt
The Tax Court has required the reduction in fair market value of donated
art because of restrictions on the donee's right to sell in two cases. In
47.

Currently there is no equivalent requirement for estate and gift tax purposes. JOSEPH
9.02 (2003/04). For gift and
estate tax purposes, the donor must submit such information as the IRS requests. Id. (citing
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2055-1(c) and 25.2522(a)-1(c)).
48. I.R.S. Form 8283 (rev. Oct. 1998); see I.R.S. Instructions for Form 8383, at 1 (rev.
Oct. 1998) (detailing who must file Form 8283).
49. See I.R.S. Form 8283, Part II, line 3 (requiring donor to attach a statement of
conditions).
50. See I.R.S. Form 8283, Part H, line 3(a) (requiring donor to disclose restrictions on the
P. TocE, JR. ET AL., TAx ECONOMICS OF CHARITABLE GIVING

donee's right to use or dispose of the property).

51. I.R.S. Publ. 561, at 8 (rev. Feb. 2000). IRS Publications are meant to provide
assistance to taxpayers in preparing tax returns. See LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W.
MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 812 (2d ed. 2002) (detailing the
authority of various types of IRS publications). The IRS is not bound by statements made in its
Publications. Id.
52. I.R.S. Publ. 561, at 8 (rev. Feb. 2000).

53.

Id. at9.

54.

Id. at 10.

TAX VALUATION OF GIFTS TO ART MUSEUMS
Silverman v. Commissioner,55 the taxpayer had-over the course of several
years-given gifts of 148 paintings to various museums. 6 With each gift, the
donee accepted a condition that it would agree not to dispose of the painting for
a three-year period. 57 The IRS assessed a deficiency under I.R.C. § 170 based
58
on the amounts of charitable deductions the taxpayer claimed for the gifts.
The court allowed the deduction but required that the fair market value reflect,
inter alia, the restriction placed on alienability. 59 The court noted that
"property otherwise intrinsically more valuable which is encumbered by some
restriction or condition limiting its marketability must be valued in light of such
limitation."6° The court agreed that the restriction at issue was not as great as a
like restriction on "securities or other property of rapidly fluctuating value" but
found that the61
effect of the restriction was nonetheless "more than of negligible
significance. ,
In Murphy v. Commissioner,6 2 the taxpayer donated a large rock sculpture
to a Texas college and took a $500,000 income tax deduction. 63 As a
restriction on the donation, the college agreed not to sell or otherwise dispose of
the sculpture within two years of the donation. 64 Based primarily on a lack of
confidence in the taxpayer's appraisal,65 the tax court found that the taxpayer
was only eligible for a $30,000 deduction.66 In so finding, the court specifically
stated that it was taking into account the two-year restriction on alienability. 67
Both Silverman and Murphy are Tax Court Memorandum Opinions with
no precedential value.68 Therefore, neither has been cited in primary cases or in
IRS opinion letters or memoranda. 69 Memorandum opinions are nonbinding,
55. Silverman v. Comm'r, 27 T.C.M. 1066 (1968).
56. Id. at 1072.
57. Id. at 1075.
58. Id. at 1073
59. Id. at 1075.
60. Id. (quoting Cooley v. Comm'r, 33 T.C. 223, 225 (1959), aft'd,283 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.
1960)).
61. ld.
62. Murphy v. Comm'r, 61 T.C.M. 2935 (1991), rev'don other grounds, 8 F.3d 28 (9th
Cir. 1993).
63. Id. at 2936.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 2940 (finding the IRS's appraisal more credible than the taxpayers's).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See LEDERMAN & TAzzA, supra note 51, at 280 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that
Memorandum Opinions have no precedential value).
69. I have Shepardized both cases on Westlaw. Neither has been cited in primary sources
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however, because they are issued by tax court judges only in cases that apply
clear law to new facts. 70 This restriction in the use of memorandum opinions
would presumably allow the inference that the devaluation of gifts with
restrictions on alienation is a settled matter of law. Despite this inference,
however, the IRS seems to consider the matter with regard to gifts of art settled
as to the fact that such gifts should not be devalued.
E. The IRS's Position Regardingthe Valuation of Restricted
DonationsofArt
A canvas of IRS private letter rulings regarding restricted gifts of art to
museums in the past fifteen years 7' demonstrates that the IRS is unwilling to
reduce the fair market value of a charitable donation of art to a museum
because of restrictions placed on the gift. Two of the rulings involved very
similar transfers of art to a museum in which the donors stipulated that at least
part of the collection must be displayed continuously and the donor and later
the donor's children would have display control rights over the installation of
exhibits of the work.72 The display control rights retained by the donor were
limited by a "good museum practice standard" to be arbitrated by an
independent professional museum curator in the event of a conflict. 73 The
donor and the donor's children retained the right to demand compliance with
any of the terms of the gift. 74 If after a demand, the museum still failed to
comply, the museum would automatically lose its interest in the collection.75 In
the first ruling, the possession would revert to the donor or donor's children.76
In the second ruling, the ownership rights would be transferred to another
charitable organization.77
for the proposition that a restriction on alienation should depress the fair market value of a
donated gift.
70.

LEDERMAN & TAZZA, supra note 51, at 280 (2d ed. 2002).

71. Private letter rulings have no precedential value and are only binding as to the
taxpayer to whom they are addressed. See I.R.C. § 6110 (k)(3) (2000) (disclaiming any
precedential value of written determinations). However, they are instructive in determining the
IRS's position on ambiguous tax matters. This Note presents the four Private Letter Rulings
issued in the past fifteen years that deal with the valuation of donations of art to charitable
organizations.
72. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-014 (June 7,2002).
73. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-014 (June 7, 2002).
74. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-014 (June 7,2002).
75. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-014 (June 7,2002).
76. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993).
77. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-014 (June 7, 2002).
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In the first ruling, in determining first that the donation was deductible
under the income, gift, and estate tax provisions, the IRS found that the
reversion rights and the display control rights retained by the donor and donor's
children were "largely fiduciary powers to be exercised in furtherance of the
charitable purpose of the Donee. ' ,78 As such, the IRS determined that the
donor's display control rights and reversion rights had no value for income,
gift, or estate tax purposes. 79 Therefore, the IRS found that these retained
interests would not reduce the fair market value of the collection, and the
deductions would be allowed for the full fair market value.8 °
In the second ruling, the IRS likewise determined that the display control
rights were not substantial. 81 The IRS noted that because the donor did not
retain any reversionary interest, the transfer was deductible.82 In determining
the value of potential income, gift, and estate tax charitable deductions, the IRS
noted that because the rights retained by the grantor were not substantial,
valuation should be based on the full fair market value of the collection.83
From these two rulings, it appears that the IRS has taken the position that if the
grantor's retained interest is not substantial, it should not affect the fair market
value of the item(s) transferred.
A third ruling involved the bequest of a collection of paintings to a
museum. 84 The terms of the agreement required that the museum exhibit the
85
works permanently and continuously in a coherent and integrated manner.
The agreement provided for removal of the pieces for conservation, restoration,
and loan, as well as for the possible deaccessioning of the pieces as long as the
proceeds were used for acquisition of similar works of art.86 Any works of art
87
acquired from deaccessions would also be subject to the terms of the bequest.
It is important to keep in mind that this proposed donation is distinguishable
from the rulings discussed above 88 because the terms of this gift allowed the
museum to deaccession the donated art under certain conditions.89
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993).
Id.
Id.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-014 (June 7, 2002).
Id.
Id.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-02-032 (Jan. 11, 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussing the first two rulings).
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-02-032 (Jan. 11, 2002).
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Despite this allowance, this donation should be considered along with
other donations that absolutely forbid deaccessioning because of the limits
placed on the museum's professional decisionmaking power regarding
deaccessioning. The taxpayer's estate retained no reversionary interest. 9° The
instrument provided that if the museum accepted the gift, it would agree to
submit to the jurisdiction of a court for purposes of any suit brought by the
taxpayer's executors for injunction or specific performance of the provisions of
the agreement. 9 1 The IRS determined that the estate tax deduction would equal
the full fair market value of the taxpayer's interest in the art includible in the
taxpayer's gross estate. 92 In making its determination, the IRS noted that after
the museum accepts the bequest, it cannot be divested of ownership of the
collection.93 The IRS also noted that the agreement provided that the museum
could deaccession and loan the works in the collection subject to certain
conditions.94
In the fourth ruling, the IRS again determined that the charitable deduction
allowable for gift and estate tax purposes would be equal to the full fair market
value without regard to the numerous restrictions placed on the bequest. 95 The
transfer at issue in this letter involved shared responsibilities between a
foundation and a museum, both of which were qualified charitable
organizations.96 The museum was to receive a fee simple interest in the
collection subject to a condition subsequent. 97 The display of the collection
was to be split between the museum and the foundation, which would take over
control of the donor's gallery after the donor's death.98 The agreement required
further that a minimum number of works from the collection would be
permanently displayed at the museum. 99 The museum retained full
responsibility for insuring, conserving, and providing curatorial services for all
art in the collection, whether it was to be housed at the museum or at the
foundation's gallery. °° The agreement further provided that the museum could
not deaccession by sale, trade, or transfer any of the works in the collection, and
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-18-002 (Apr. 30, 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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if it did so, the ownership of that work would automatically vest in the
foundation.'10 Further, if the museum failed to meet any of the conditions of
the bequest, the foundation retained a power of termination10 2 over the
bequest. 103 If the foundation terminated the museum's interest, the instrument
provided that the foundation would take full ownership of the collection."1n
Noting that under no circumstances would the interest in the collection "revert
to the Taxpayers or inure to the benefit of other private individuals," the IRS
determined that the full 0fair
market value of the collection should be allowed as
5
a charitable deduction.1
These four private letter rulings show the IRS's consistent application of
its determination that limitations on alienability should not depress the fair
market value of a donated piece of art. The IRS seems to ignore that such
restrictions can often harm the museum in the future. It is likely that the IRS
allows the full deduction as a way of encouraging charitable giving.'0 6 This
practice, however, ignores the fact that charitable giving is encouraged only as
a way of supporting charitable institutions.10 7
IlL A Proposalto Limit the Value of CharitableDeductions on Overly
Restricted Gifts
The premise underlying the encouragement of charitable giving is that the
government wants to support certain types of social institutions. 1 8 Because of
the unique legal and financial circumstances of museums,' °9 however, the
101. Id.
102. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 24 (1936) (defining a "power of termination" as
"the option to terminate an estate upon breach of a condition subsequent").
103. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-18-002 (Apr. 30, 2004).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In researching this Note, I have not been able to find any IRS statement explaining
why it does not depress the value of the deduction in these situations.
107. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing the policy behind the taxexempt organization).
108. This theoretical foundation for the tax-exempt status of certain social institutions is
referred to as the subsidy rationale. See JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARrrABLE
TAX EXEMPTION 22-27 (1995) (discussing the subsidy rationale to explain charitable
exemptions in modem times); MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 3, at 34-41 (discussing
oversight by taxing authorities and the modem theory of tax exemption as federal financial
assistance).
109. See infra Parts V.B.2-3 (discussing the cypres doctrine and the conflicting duties of
museum trustees with regard to restricted gifts).
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burden of restrictions on some donations can outweigh the benefits.110
Therefore, restrictions on alienability should be discouraged by taking them
into account in determining an item's fair market value for charitable
deduction purposes."' Instead, the fair market value of the art should be
depressed to account for the limitations placed on the donee's rights with
regard to the disposition of the art.
Most private art museums are organized as charitable organizations
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 112 Museums are specifically listed in the
regulations of that section as an example of charitable organizations that
serve an educational function. 1 13 The Court interpreted the legislative
purpose of I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3) and 170114 in Bob Jones University v.
United States. 115 It found that Congress intended "to give tax benefits to
organizations" that serve "charitable purposes" through the enactment of

110. For specific instances, see infra Part V.B. 1 (examining what clear donor intent would
mean for museum professionals).
111. The IRS already reduces the allowable deduction because of restrictions in other
circumstances. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-99, 1985-2 C.B. 83 (determining that the amount of the
taxpayer's deduction for a gift of real property with a restrictive covenant on its use to be the
fair market value of the property in light of the restrictions placed on its use). A distinction can
be made in the case of real property because of the enforceability of restrictive covenants. The
enforceability of restrictions of gifts of personal property and the likelihood of any enforcement
are less certain. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the cy pres doctrine).
112. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). See ROBERTC. LiNDETAL., ART&MUSEUMLAw: CASES
AND MATERIALS 471-72 (2002) (discussing the process of application for tax exemption for art
museums); MARILYN E. PHtELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE FOR OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND

COUNSEL §§ 8:01-8:14, at 291-306 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the process and requirements for
application for 501(c)(3) status).
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii) ex. 4 (listing museums among educational
organizations).
114. I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3) (2000).
115. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983). In Bob Jones
University, the Supreme Court considered the validity of the IRS's decision to deny tax exempt
status to two private religious schools that had racially discriminatory policies. Id. at 579-84.
The Court looked beyond the specific words of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), which exempts religious
institutions, and examined the statute in light of the framework of the Internal Revenue Code
and the legislative purpose behind the rule. Id. at 586-92. The Court determined, based on the
scheme of the Internal Revenue Code and the history of exemptions for charitable organizations,
that the purposes of the exemption in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and the charitable deductions incident
to the exemptions were to benefit organizations serving charitable purposes. Id. at 587. The
Court noted that throughout the history of exempting charitable organizations from taxation,
only charities that benefit the public and act in conformity with public policies are given
exemptions. Id. at 588-91. The Court found therefore that because both of these institutions
had racial discrimination policies that were contrary to public policy, the IRS properly denied
them tax-exempt status. Id. at 605.
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I.R.C. §§ 170 and 501(c)(3). 116 Given that the primary purpose of these
provisions is to benefit charity, any benefit to the taxpayer is secondary and
merely for the purpose of providing incentive to the taxpayer to assist with
the greater goal of benefiting charities. 117 In keeping with the purpose of
these provisions, the IRS should value the amount of benefit to the museum
for purposes of determining the deduction. However, in the Private Letter
Rulings discussed above, 118 the IRS focused on what the donor had given
and not what the donee had received. 119 This Note proposes that the IRS
shift the focus and value the gift based on what the art museum receives by
determining what a willing buyer having full knowledge of all restrictions
would pay for the gift.
Returning to our hypothetical, if such a policy had been in place in
1959 when Ms. Bums donated her art to the Springfield museum, she may
have removed the restrictions. If so, the museum today could deaccession
the more peripheral pieces and have money to restore and properly
conserve a core collection. If Ms. Burns was still reluctant to remove the
restrictions, the museum would have more leverage to negotiate the terms
of the gift agreement with her, possibly suggesting precatory language
regarding alienation. If Ms. Bums insisted on the restrictions, the
Springfield museum may have chosen not to accept the donation. It is
unlikely that this would have happened in 1959, but it is much more likely
to happen today as museum collection policies have become more focused
and museums are increasingly aware of the future dangers of restricted
gifts.

116. Id. at 587-88.
117. For an interesting discussion of the evolution of the modem subsidy rationale for
charitable exemptions and the need for further consideration of the extent of the exempt sector,
see generally COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 108.
118. See supra Part II.E (outlining the IRS's recent positions regarding restricted gifts of
art to museums).
119. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993) (finding that because the donor's
retained rights had no value for tax purposes, the charitable deduction would be equal to the full
fair market value without regard to the restrictions on the gift); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-23-014
(June 7, 2002) (finding that the fair market value should not be reduced because the donor's
retained rights were insubstantial); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2004-18-002 (Apr. 30, 2004) (determining
that the taxpayer was entitled to a full fair market value deduction because the collection would
not .revert to the donor under any circumstances). But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-02-032 (Jan. 11,
2002) (determining that the taxpayer was entitled to a full fair market value deduction because
the museum could not be divested of its ownership of the item).
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IV. The Effects of This Proposalon Different Aspects of the Law of
CharitableGiving
A. Rule Against Restraints on Alienation and the Exception
for CharitableUses
The common law rule against restraints on alienation normally would
disallow a donation of art that restrains the museum's ability to sell in
perpetuity; however, charities are excepted from this rule. 120 The common law
rule is based on a policy against keeping property out of commerce and
obstructing business affairs. 12 1 Several reasons are given for the exception for
charities. The first reason is to acknowledge that under equitable principles of
common law, the prohibition on transfer may have a limited effect. 122 In the
case of charitable trusts and nonprofit organizations with gifts that expressly
restrict the charity's ability to sell the art, the doctrine of cy pres allows the
court to release the restriction and give the charity the power of sale when the
sale is found to be for the public benefit generally contemplated by the
donor. 123 The cy pres doctrine has proven effective for museums seeking to
reform donations in many instances.124 One could argue that the same
uncertainty engendered by the possible use of the cy pres doctrine in the future
should give the donor a right to receive a full fair market deduction at the time
of the donation: If there is a substantial likelihood that a court will modify or
abandon the donor's restrictions in the future, why should a donor have to pay
for those restrictions? This argument, however, focuses on what the donor has
given. As this Note argues, because the ultimate purpose of the charitable

120. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 349 (Rev. 2d ed. 1992) (discussing the court's equitable power under the cy pres

doctrine and the rule that charitable trusts are allowed to be perpetual as reasons for the
exception); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 (2) (1983)
(stating that restraints on alienation of donated property may be valid if the policies favoring
freedom of alienation do not apply). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 398 cmt. a
(1944) (stating that a perpetual charitable trust is valid because the desirability of encouraging
gifts to charity outweighs other factors that normally justify restrictions on the duration of
trusts).

121. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 120, § 349 (discussing these policy implications
with regard to the exception for charities).
122. See id. (stating that because a court of equity retains the power to require the sale
against the donor's wishes, the prohibition of transfer is limited).
123. See id. § 392 (stating that courts have authorized the sale of trust property in spite of
express restrictions on alienability in numerous cases).
124. See infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of clear donor
intent on the court's application of the cy pres doctrine).
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deduction is to benefit the museum, valuation must focus on what the museum
receives. Even if a court in equity were to remove the restriction in the future,
it likely would not do so without considerable expense to the museum and it
would strive to find a balance as close as possible to the donor's originally
expressed intent. 25 Therefore, the general exception from the rule against
restraints on alienation should not operate to give the donor a full deduction
based on the argument that the restriction may be modified in the future.
The second reason given for the exception for charities is that the law
26
allows perpetuity in charitable trusts, while it forbids it in most other cases.1
The rationale for this larger exception has been described as "an implicit quid
pro quo. ', 27 The donor receives the exceptional right to control the use and
disposition of the item in perpetuity in exchange for allowing her property to
pass from the private to the public arena. 128 Any effect of this rationale on the
valuation of the charitable deduction under this proposal is secondary.
Concomitant with the supposed benefits to the donor and the public is a
limitation on the donee. This limitation diminishes the value of what the
museum receives, and the donor's deduction should reflect that diminution.
There is one narrow exception in which the traditional rule against
restraints on alienation applies to donations to charity: Donated gifts with a
gift-over to a noncharitable entity, other than the donor, are not excepted from
the rule against perpetuities. 129 In these situations, the rule voids the gift-over
and the first interest retains the full right.130 With regard to the tax valuation in
light of the applicable rule against perpetuities in this instance, the argument for
a depressed valuation in these circumstances would be the same as above where
the possibility of failure analysis is not required, and the valuation is 131
based on
the fair market value of the restricted gift that the museum receives.
125. See Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy PresReform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1115 (1993)
(noting that the court's power under cy pres is "closely circumscribed").
126. See BOGERT&BOGERT, supra note 120, §349 (stating that the allowance of perpetuity
necessarily requires some degree of restraint on alienability); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROP. § 398 cmt. a (1944) (stating that a perpetual charitable trust is valid because the
desirability of encouraging gifts to charity outweighs other factors that normally justify
restrictions on the duration of trusts).
127. Atkinson, supra note 125, at 1114.
128. See id. at 1114-15 (noting the balance between public benefit and perpetual donor
control).
129. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 120, § 347 (discussing the application of the rule
against perpetuities on charitable donations).
130. Id. (discussing the effects of the application of the rule against perpetuities). Bogert
notes that jurisdictions differ with regard to the application of this exception to the exception.
See id. (noting different state cases in the footnotes).
131. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (discussing valuation where a
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B. The Possibilityof Failureof the Initial Interest
As noted above, 132 certain fee simple defeasible interests are subject to a
threshold requirement for deductibility. If the gift-over is to a noncharitable party,
the charitable deduction will be allowed only if the possibility of failure of the initial
interest is so remote as to be negligible.1 33 Because the IRS has determined that the
possibility of failure in these instances is negligible, such an interest should not be
valued for tax purposes. Instead, the IRS should focus solely on the reduced value
134
of the interest given to charity.
In circumstances that do not require the threshold analysis of the possibility of
failure, the valuation of deductions would be more complicated but should still be
based on the value of what the museum receives rather than what the donor gives.
One circumstance in which the possibility of failure analysis is not required occurs
when another charity would take in the case of the failure of a lead interest. 135 In
such circumstances, the IRS should determine the value of the deduction based on
the aggregate value of what the charities receive. The aggregate value of the
fragmented rights in the donated piece of art should be less than the full fair market
value of an unrestricted interest in the art.136 The depression in value is based on the
perceptions of the hypothetical buyer and seller who have full knowledge of the
relevant facts. Imagining two hypothetical buyers, one each for the first and
possibility of failure analysis is not required).
132.

See supra Part I.A (discussing the threshold requirement for fee simple defeasible

interests).
133. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing the Treasury Regulation
requirements regarding the deductibility of restricted gifts); Comm'r v. Estate of Stemberger,
348 U.S. 187, 199 (1955) (finding that the taxpayer's bequest to charity contingent on the
taxpayer's daughter dying without issue was not deductible because there was "no assurance
that charity [would] receive the bequest of some determinable part of it"). The IRS has
interpreted this possibility of failure requirement to apply only to transfers that ultimately would
pass out of charity generally in the event of failure. See supra note 33 (discussing the IRS's
application of the regulations to gifts that were guaranteed to go to a charity).
134. But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-43-004 (Jan. 7, 1994) (stating that the deduction for a
restricted charitable donation with a possibility of reverter was allowable because the possibility
of failure of the gift was so remote as to be negligible but the deduction must be reduced by the
value of any possibility of reversion).
135. See supra note 33 (discussing the IRS's application of the regulations to gifts that
were guaranteed to go to charity).
136. I have in mind a scheme somewhat analogous to the discounts for fractional interests
allowed for donative transfers. See Estate of Bonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196, 197-98 (5th
Cir. 1996) (allowing a fractional interest discount in the decedent's estate tax for a boat in which
the decedent owned a 50% interest); see also Bogdanski, supra note 44, 5.01[2][b] (stating
that the reasons for the allowed discount include the possibility of an irreconcilable conflict or
dispute between the joint tenants and the leeriness of a hypothetical buyer to enter into such an
arrangement).
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contingent interest, the sum of the values that the buyers would pay would not equal
the full fair market value of the art. The sum would be reduced because each
knowledgeable buyer in turn would require a reduction in price in light of the
relevant restriction (or the ultimate possibility of loss of ownership) or contingency.
The possibility of failure analysis is also not required when the taxpayer
restricts the alienability of the gift but fails to provide for a contingency in the event
of a violation of those restrictions or otherwise ensures that the museum will not be
divested of its ownership of the donated piece. 137 When such gifts are made, the
focus is not on the contingency of failure. The museum, however, is still obligated
to comply with the donor's intentions regarding the restriction.' 38 Such compliance
can be costly for the museum. In certain circumstances, the restriction may even
compromise the art. 139 Because of these potential costs to the museum, 140 the fair
market value should also be reduced in these circumstances.
C. The Effects of This Proposalon the Three Types of FederalTaxpayers
1. Income Tax
The deduction allowed by I.R.C. § 170 is an itemized deduction not
subject to the two-percent floor limitation on miscellaneous itemized

137. For example, in a recent private letter ruling, the taxpayer donated a collection of art
to a museum on the condition that the collection would be permanently continuously displayed.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-02-032 (Jan. 11, 2003). The gift agreement, however, contained a
provision allowing the museum to deaccession the works under certain circumstances, Id. The
agreement also required that the museum submit itself to the jurisdiction of a court with the
power to direct specific performance or injunctive relief against the museum in the event of a
breach. Id. The agreement provided expressly that no provision or condition of the agreement
could divest the museum of its ownership of the collection. Id.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 380 cmt. d (1959) (stating that the trustee's
power to sell is limited if the terms of the trust implicitly or explicitly forbid sale); see also id.
§ 401 cmt. b (1959) (stating that where the donor fails to provide specific conditions in the
donation instrument but restricts the donee's power over the gift, the restrictions do not have the
power of a condition, whereby the donee's failure to abide by the restrictions would cause
failure of the gift and reversion to the donor; however, the donees may be compelled to abide by
the restricted terms of the gift).
139. For example, in the terms of his gift to Harvard University, Mark Rothko required that
five of his large paintings be displayed together in a certain configuration. John T. Bethell,
Damaged Goods, HARV. MAG., Jul.-Aug. 1988, at 25, 27. It was not until after Rothko's death
that Harvard realized the extent of the light damage that had been done to the paintings. Id. at
30. Despite the restriction that the paintings should never be moved without permission of the
artist or his representative, Harvard removed the paintings to dark storage. Id. at 30-31.
140. See supra note 12 (stating the estimated cost of museum storage).
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deductions of I.R.C. § 67. 141The deduction is subject to a limitation for higher
income individuals based on adjusted gross income. 42 The allowance of yearly
deductions for capital gain property is capped at 30% of the taxpayer's
contribution base for the year. 43 The Code provides for a limited carry-over of
excess contributions for the following five years.44 Any such deduction
is only
45
Secretary."
the
by
prescribed
regulations
under
allowed "if verified
The value of the allowable deduction to any given taxpayer primarily
depends on the taxpayer's income tax bracket. As of 2004, the maximum tax
rate was 36.9% and applied to taxpayer's with taxable incomes of over
$250,000.146 Taxpayers in the highest income bracket receive the greatest gain
from charitable deductions because such a taxpayer's after-tax cost of the
donation is reduced by 36.9%. "4' The 36.9% reduction represents foregone
revenue by the federal government and has been referred to as an indirect
federal subsidy of the recipient charity.1 48 A reduction in the fair market value
of a charitable contribution would represent a loss to the taxpayer at the
taxpayer's income tax rate because the amount of the reduction would again
become part of the taxpayer's taxable income.

2. Estate Taxes
The potential consequences of a reduction in fair market value for those
required to pay estate tax 149 may be more severe because of the higher tax rate.

141.

See I.R.C. § 67(b)(4) (2000) (excluding I.R.C. § 170 deductions from its definition of

miscellaneous itemized deductions); see also id. § 67(a) (limiting miscellaneous itemized
deductions to the extent to which they exceed 2% of the taxpayer's aggregate gross income).
142.

See I.R.C. § 68(a) (2000) (reducing the deductible amount for individuals whose

income exceeds the applicable amount). The applicable amount for taxable years beginning in
2005 is $145,950 or $72,975 for married individuals filing separately. Rev. Proc. 2004-71,
2004-50 I.R.B. 970.
143.

See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(i) (capping contributions of capital gain property).

Contribution base is defined as the taxpayer's "adjusted gross income.., computed without
regard to any net operating loss carryback." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(e) (as amended in 1972).

144. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2000) (providing carryover of basis for five years).
145. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2000).
146. I.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(c) (2000).
147. See WEIL,A CABINET OF CURiosrrEs, supranote 8, at 170 (illustrating the after-cost of
charitable contributions by taxpayers paying different rates).
148. See id. (referring to the taxpayer's tax savings as an indirect federal subsidy). For
more on the subsidy rationale for tax-exempt organizations, see supra Part III.
149. It is important to keep in mind that as of 2005 only estates above $1,500,000 are
subject to estate taxes. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2000).
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I.R.C. § 2033 requires that the decedent's estate include the value of any
property in which the decedent had an interest at the time of her death.' 50 If the
decedent provided for the donation of art to a charitable organization in her will
under I.R.C. § 2055, the value of that donation would be deducted from the
decedent's estate. 151 If, because of the restrictions placed on the bequest, the
value of the decedent's interest in a donated piece was greater than the fair
market value of the donation, the difference would be included in the
decedent's gross estate. Depending on the 152
size of the decedent's estate, the tax
cost of that inclusion could be substantial.
3. Gift Taxes
The effect of a reduction in the fair market value of a deduction based on
what the museum receives would be similar for gift taxpayers. Currently, the
charitable deduction allowed by I.R.C. § 2522153 offsets the gift tax imposed by
I.R.C. § 2501154 in almost all circumstances. Under current requirements, the
regulations specify that the tax is imposed on the fair market value of the
property passing from the donor not on the property received by the donee. 155
The current regulations, however, do not define the method by which to value
the deduction. If, as this Note proposes, the IRS were to value the deduction
based on what the museum receives and not what the donor gives, most
restricted gift situations would result in a gift tax to the donor for the difference
in the two values. If the donor relinquishes all rights to the gift in that she
retains no reversionary interest but restricts the museum's right to dispose of
150. See I.R.C. § 2033 (2000) (defining the property to be included in the decedent's gross
estate).
151. See I.R.C. § 2055 (2000) (deducting charitable contributions from the value of the
taxable estate).
152. As of 2005, the highest marginal estate tax rate is 47%. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2).
However, it is important to remember that The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 provides for a phase out of the estate tax to culminate in a repeal of the tax on
January 1, 2010. ROBERT T. DANFORTH, Now You SEE IT, Now You DON'T: AN ESTATE
PLANNING PERSPECTIVE ON CONGRESS'S DISAPPEARING TAX ACT 1 (July 1, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It is not really a repeal. During
the year 2010, the estate tax will be replaced with a partial carryover basis scheme. Id. at 4.
Then in January 2011, the estate tax law will revert to the law as it was in effect in 2001. Id. at
1. Though it is difficult to predict how, Professor Danforth states that the new tax rules are
likely to change before the end of the phase out period. Id. at 6.
153. I.R.C. § 2522 (2000).
154. I.R.C. § 2501 (2000).
155. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (as amended in 1999).
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the gift, the gift tax would be imposed on the whole value of what the donor
has relinquished, but only the depressed value of what the museum received
would be deducted. Similarly, in the case of a gift-over to another qualified
charity 156 in the event of a failure of the gift condition, the donor would be
taxed on the entire amount of the gift less the value of the aggregate of the two
gifts to charity. 57 In the case of a reversion to the taxpayer or the taxpayer's
estate in the event of a failure of the gift, the value of the reversion is not
subject to gift tax so long as the reversion can be valued with accepted
valuation methods. 158 Despite this limitation on the value of the overall gift, the
donor would still be liable for the taxes on the difference between what she was
deemed to have given and the value of what the museum received.
V. The Effects of DepressedValuation
If the restriction placed on the donation decreases the allowable deduction,
the taxpayer can either remove the restriction and receive a full fair market
value deduction 159 or insist on the restriction and receive a lesser deduction. As
always, the museum also has a choice whether to accept the donation.' 6° It is
impossible to predict whether the donor will remove the restriction. The
donor's actions depend in part on her motivation for the donation.16 ' The more
prevalent tax savings are in the donor's thinking, the more likely she will
remove the restriction. On the other hand, if the donor feels strongly about the
stated restriction, she will be more willing to suffer the tax consequences of her
requirement. Because of the difficulty museums encounter when dealing with
156. See I.R.C. § 2522 (2000) (providing a description of the types of charities that qualify
for a gift tax charitable deduction).
157. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (proposing a valuation scheme for
charitable gifts with a gift-over to another charity).
158. See Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(e) (as amended in 1997) (stating that the gift tax applies
to donor's retained interest if that interest cannot be measured with accepted valuation
principles).
159. See Malaro, RestrictedGifts, supra note 23, at 53 (stating that in situations in which
donors are confronted with museums that have a policy prohibiting the acceptance of restricted
gifts, it is rare for the donor to insist upon the restriction).
160. See id. at 53-54 (noting that even museums with policies against acceptance of
restricted gifts sometimes make an exception because of the value or interest of the proffered
gift or because of the needs of the museum).
161. Donor motivations vary greatly and are often simultaneously altruistic and selfserving. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 108, at 120-31 (discussing various possible motives
for donating to charity); Vanni, supra note 23, at 3 (describing the different concerns and
agendas of modem donors).
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restricted donations of art, it would be preferable for the donor to remove the
restriction and receive the full tax benefit of the donation.
Even if the donor maintains the requirement, the fact that the donor was
forced to affirmatively choose the requirement over the foregone tax benefit
will reduce ambiguity in the gift instrument by substantiating the level of
commitment of the donor to the imposed restrictions.' 62 In many instances, the
museum will likely refuse the gift. 163
A. The Donor's Choice to Remove the Restriction or Withdraw
the Offered Donation
In his article Restrictions on CharitableBequests ofArt, Fox argues that
reducing the charitable deduction for gifts of art with restrictions on alienability
would ultimately discourage such contributions and should not be required
because to do so would violate the policy underlying tax deductions for
charitable transfers of property. 164 As support for his position, Fox notes that
judicial policy favors liberal construction of charitable deductions statutes to
encourage contributions. 165 While it is true that in certain situations the entire
gift would be discouraged by the reduced deductibility, it is not clear how often
that would happen. Malaro notes that as charities have gained increased control
over their assets,166 the level of giving has not decreased. 167 Malaro concludes
from this evidence that when faced with a challenge to proposed restrictions,
the donor often will withdraw the restriction. 168 In those circumstances in
which the donor does not withdraw the restriction on alienation, according to

162. But see Sare, supra note 45, at 391 n.45 (arguing that the symmetrical argument that a
reduced tax deduction should lead to a more restricted application of the cy pres doctrine is
based on the false premise that the donor retains an interest in her gift).
163. See Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM Din., supra note 1, at 9 (stating that acquisitions made
through gift or bequest should be unrestricted whenever possible). See generally Malaro,
Restricted Gifts, supra note 23 (arguing that the acceptance of restricted gifts by museum
professionals conflicts with their fiduciary responsibilities).
164. Richard L. Fox, Restrictions on CharitableBequests ofArt: Recentfir.Ruling Paints
a Picture, 29 EST. PLAN. 452, 458-59 (2002).
165. See id. at 459 n.37 ("The exemption of income devoted to charity and the reduction of
the rate of tax on capital gains were liberalizations of the law in the taxpayer's favor, were
begotten from the motives of public policy, and are not to be narrowly construed.") (quoting
Comm'r v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934)).
166. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the relaxation of the cy pres doctrine).
167. Malaro, Restricted Gifts, supra note 23, at 72 n.52.
168. Id.
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current professional 169
museum standards, it is likely that the museum will not
donation.
the
accept
B. Clarifying Donor Intent
If the donor chooses to forgo part of her tax benefit to maintain the
restriction on the museum's ability to sell, the donor has made a clear signal of
the level of her commitment to the restriction.
The clarity of the donor's
intent will provide improved guidance in several situations. First, museum
professionals will have more information with which to make professional
acquisitions decisions. 171 Second, during the administration of the restricted
gift, the trustees or directors will have more guidance as to when their duties of
loyalty to the public and of obedience to the terms of the interest conflict to the
point that they should petition a court for relief from the restriction. 72 Third,
should the museum choose to accept the piece, a court in a later reformation
action would1 have
more knowledge of the donor's specific intent with regard to
73
the donation.

1. What Clear DonorIntent Would Mean for Museum Professionals
As discussed earlier, professional museum codes discourage the
acceptance of restricted gifts. At the same time, museums depend on donors
for support. 174 In weighing the benefits and burdens of an attractive gift along
169. See supranote 163 and accompanying text (discussing the unwillingness of museums
to accept restricted gifts).
170. In the future, given the knowledge that the IRS no longer allows a full fair market
value deduction for gifts that restrict the museum's ability to alienate, the donor and the
museum would discuss the donor's tax decision in negotiating the gift. Further, if the gift is the
subject of a later reformation action, the court could use evidence of the donor's tax appraisals
to indicate the level of the donor's commitment to the restrictions.
171. See MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 3, at 137 ("It is wise for a museum to have
a general policy that prohibits the acceptance of restricted gifts. It is also wise to have a
procedure for considering exceptions to the rule.").
172. See id. at 135 (stating that if a museum accepts a restricted gift, it should "seek court
relief only when circumstances clearly make adherence to the restriction impossible or
impractical").
173. But see Sare, supra note 45, at 391 n.45 (arguing that the symmetrical argument that a
reduced tax deduction should lead to a more restricted application of the cy pres doctrine is
based on the false premise that the donor retains an interest in her gift).
174. See Malaro, Deaccessioning,supra note 6, at 274 (stating that it is estimated that over
90% of the objects in United States museums have been donated).
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with the current needs of the museum, the trustees of a museum may be
compelled to accept a donor's restrictions.175 The trustees may be less likely to
be overcome by "myopia" if they realize the extent of the donor's attachment to
the requirement of the restrictions. This is especially true if courts and
attorneys general are likely to interpret the donor's having foregone tax savings
as indicative of the level of commitment to the specific intent of the restrictions
and thereby more assiduously enforce the donor's intent.
Fox argues that because of the professional decision making power of
76
museums, no reduction in the value of the restricted item should be required. 1
Fox states:
The acceptance of the collection in such a case is indicative of the position
of the museum's board of trustees that owning the collection, even subject
to a permanent restriction on sale, furthers the museum's long-term
educational purposes and is otherwise in the museum's best interests. To
reduce the amount of the available estate tax charitable deduction in such a
case would, in effect, make the IRS or the courts the ultimate arbiter of
those restrictions that can be permanently imposed on charitable bequests
of artwork-an issue
77 clearly better left to the judgment of the museum's
board of trustees.1
Fox is correct that the decision belongs to the museum professionals. By extension,
however, this does not require that the IRS implicitly support restricted giving. The
IRS should discourage restrictions and leave the acceptance decision to the museum
professionals.
Additionally, Fox's argument that the acceptance of the restricted gift by the
museum board indicates that the overall gift is in the museum's best interest ignores
the primary problem with restricted perpetual gifts17 8-it is impossible to predict the
future circumstances under which a museum may need to deaccession the work. In
the Springfield museum hypothetical, for instance, the museum had no way of
knowing the economic fate of the town when it accepted the paintings in 1959.
Making a good decision regarding acceptance would require that the museum
79
trustees be able to predict the future best interests of the museum in perpetuity.
175. See MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 3, at 135 ("Unfortunately, even among
those who should know better, the offer of an attractive gift, though tightly bound, can bring on
a sudden case of myopia.").
176. Fox, supra note 164, at 459.
177. Id.
178. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the charitable gift exception to the rule against
restraints on alienation).
179. See Malaro, Restricted Gifts, supra note 23, at 49-53 (arguing that because of the
fundamentally dynamic nature of museum missions, the duty of loyalty owed to the public as
beneficiaries, and the professional standard requiring collection review, museums should not
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The best interest of the museum, however, is dynamic and may shift over time such
that the donated item no longer comports with the museum's collection
management policy.' 80 While the restrictions on the gift may be in line with the
current museum mission and collection policy, the current financial situation of the
museum, or the facilities available to the museum at the time, the museum's trustees
cannot be assured of the museum's situation in the future. There are many wellknown examples of restricted gifts of art on which the restrictions
become onerous
8
or even harmful to the museum or the art itself over time. 1
The primary benefit of clear donor intent for the museum would be to facilitate
negotiations between the museum and the donor at the time of the proffered gift.182
The museum would be in a better negotiating position by being able to talk to the
donor about the potential tax benefits of removing the restriction. If the donor still
refused, the museum professionals could depend on their collection management
policies to determine whether to accept the gift. While museums' collection
management....
policies over the past183few years have shown an increased hesitancy and
caution regarding restricted gifts, these do not have the force of law, nor should
they. 184 The ultimate decision, therefore, rests with the museum professionals.
2. The Effect of ClearDonorIntent on the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine
Determination of the donor's intent is important in any action to reform
the terms of the gift under the doctrine of cy pres. The doctrine of cy pres
allows a court to permit the trustees of a charitable trust to deviate from the
donor's express restrictions so long as the action falls within the general
make indefinite commitments).
180. See id. at 43 (defining a collection management policy as a public document that
"describes ...the ways in which the museum acquires, uses, lends, and disposes of collection
objects").
181. See supra note 139 (discussing Rothko's gift to Harvard).
182. See Willard L. Boyd, Museums as Centers of Controversy,DAEDALUS, Summer 1999
at 185, 219-20 (stating that in any conflict with donors, "a friendly and forthright" discussion
between museum professionals and the donor is necessary but that institutional integrity must
take priority).
183. See ASS'N OF ART MUSEuM DiR., supra note 1, at 9 (stating that acquisitions by
conditional gifts should be restricted whenever possible). The Association of Art Museum
Directors is a 177-member professional organization that establishes and maintains professional
standards for its members.
Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM Dins., Mission Statement,
http://www.aamd.org/aboutl (last visited Nov. 4, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
184. See Malaro, Restricted Gifts, supra note 23, at 64 (stating that one benefit to a
publicized collections management policy is that the donor is put on notice regarding the
museum's practices).
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charitable intention of the grantor.185 A strict application of the cypres doctrine
requires that the court find that the donor had a general charitable intent toward
the charity. 86 The court must also find that it is illegal, impossible, or
impracticable for the charity to carry out the donor's specific requests. 187 A cy
pres action can be brought either by the trustees requesting permission to
deviate from the terms of the trust or by the Attorney General.188 Despite the
formalities of the cy pres, courts have a great deal of discretion in determining
whether to require compliance with the donor's intent.1 89 Using this discretion,
some courts in recent years have liberalized their application of the cy pres
doctrine, especially with regard to the distinctions between specific and general
charitable intent 1'9 and the reformed use of the donated property. 191 The trend,
however, is difficult to measure.1 92 The most recent revision of the Uniform
Trust Code explicitly creates a presumption of general charitable intent, 193 thus
proposing to codify a more liberal approach to the application of cy pres.
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959) (explaining the cy pres
doctrine).
186. See id. (explaining the general charitable intent requirement).
187. Id.
188. A.W. ScoTr & W.F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (4th ed. 1987).
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. d (1959) ("[The court will
consider evidence as to what would probably have been the wish of the settlor at the time when
he created the trust if he realized that the particular purpose could not be carried out.").
190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003) (stating that the cy pres
doctrine presumes a general charitable intent unless the terms of the trust express a contrary
intention).
191. See id. § 67 cmt. d (stating that courts increasingly allow the substitute purpose to be
reasonably similar to the donor's stated purpose rather than as close as possible).
192. Compare In re Barnes Foundation, No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655 (Pa. Com. Pl.
Dec. 13, 2004) (allowing the Foundation to move to downtown Philadelphia despite the
founder's intent that the art be housed in Merion, Pa.), and Stephen K. Urice, Some Issues
Raised by the Case(s)of the BarnesFoundation,in ALI-ABA: LEGAL PROBLEMS INMUSEUM
ADMINISTRATION, 491, 513 (1993) ("When the correct procedure is followed and the proper
parties are before the courts... courts are generally not reluctant to grant relief when the precise
directives of a testator or settlor are impractical or incapable of fulfillment under current
circumstances."); with Museum of Fine Arts v. Beland, 735 N.E.2d 1248, 1251-52 (Mass.
2000) (refusing to apply cy pres to allow the trustees to sell stored paintings that were
"permanently and inalienably" vested in the charitable trust), and Ilana H. Eisenstein, Keeping
Charity in CharitableTrust Law: The Barnes Foundationand the Casefor Considerationof
Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1747, 1756-57
(2003) (arguing that upholding donor intent is the norm and a lenient application of cypres is
the exception in the United States).
193. See UNIr. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt. (amended 2003) (stating that the revision modifies
the doctrine of cy pres by creating a presumption of general charitable intent); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003) (stating the presumption of general
charitable intent in modem cy pres doctrine).
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Although a more liberal application may immediately benefit art museums, any
such relaxation may also diminish donations. Donors who are insistent upon
their restrictions may choose not to give when faced with the94possibility that the
restriction will not be enforced by the courts in the future.
A reduction in the allowable charitable deduction would lend clarity and
predictability to courts' applications of the cypres doctrine. A donor's choice
of restriction above tax savings could be used to determine that the donor had
specific rather than general charitable intent with regard to the restrictions. 95
In doing so, a symmetrical argument is presented-where the donor has
suffered by a reduction in the amount of her charitable deduction, a more
rigorous application of the intent inquiry of the cy pres doctrine is required.
Sare states that such an argument is specious because it is based on the premise
that the donor has retained a right in the donated property and that is why the
deduction was limited. 196 The depressed deduction advocated in this Note,
however, is not based on the any retained rights in the property but instead
focuses on the fact that the museum does not receive full rights to the
property. 197 Further, the proposal focuses more specifically on the fact that the
donor has made an affirmative choice to restrict the museum's right to
alienation at a tax savings cost to herself. Any increase in courts' decisions to
disallow cy pres reform because of the donor's implicitly expressed intent to
make a specific gift should have limited effect. Only in those rare cases in
which the donor forgoes the full deduction in favor of the restrictions and the
museum accepts the gift with full knowledge of the donor's commitment to the
restriction should the court use extrinsic evidence of the charitable deduction to
refuse the application of the cy pres doctrine. Because the overarching policy
behind both relaxation of the cy pres doctrine1 98 and reduced valuation of
194. See Jonathan R. Macey, PrivateTrustsfor the Provision of PrivateGoods, 37 EMORY
L.J. 295, 314 (1988) ("Settlors have no way to avoid the risk that courts might invoke their cy
pres power to alter their expectations, and consequently the possibility always exists that their
intentions will be thwarted."). But see Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., Cy Pres: A Proposalfor
Change, 47 B.U. L. REv. 153,200 (1967) ("There are sufficient incentives for making charitable
gifts in this country to assure that under the expanded doctrine of cy pres charity will not be
deprived of its benefactors.").
195. Extrinsic evidence of the donor's tax treatment of the specific donation could be
admitted in any future cy pres action. The evidence would include the donor's tax return, as
well as the required appraisal form(s). Such information could be kept by the donee museum in
its acquisitions file for the donated item(s) or by the donor or by the IRS.
196. See Sare, supra note 45, at 391 n.45 (describing the false premise underlying the
symmetrical argument).
197. See supra Part III (discussing the focus of the proposed change).
198. See generally DiClerico, supra note 194 (advocating a relaxation in the cy pres
doctrine that would subordinate the intent of the donor to the broader interests of the public).
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charitable deductions for restricted gifts is to benefit the interest of the museum,
the reduction in the donor's charitable deduction should not affect any trend
toward relaxing the cy pres doctrine.
3. Restricted Gifts and Conflicting Duties
A trustee's or a director's fiduciary duties are substantially the same
regardless of whether the museum is organized as a charitable trust or a nonprofit
corporation. 99 Museum trustees or directors must make decisions with regard for
the museum's mission and what is in the best interest of the museum's
beneficiaries, the public. 200 At the same time, when a donation of art with a
restriction on the museum's power to alienate has been accepted, the museum
must comply with the restriction. 20 1 It is easy to see how these two duties may at
times conflict.
Whether or not the museum is under serious financial strain, a museum
trustee's duty to abide by the terms of a restricted gift may conflict with her duty
to uphold the educational mission of the museum. 2°2 In times of financial crisis, a
museum may need to cull its holdings to have funds sufficient to maintain the
museum's collection and fulfill the museum's mission.2°3 Even in times of
199. While a trustee's duty is generally regarded as stricter than a director's, the degree of
difference does not affect the issues discussed herein. See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity
FiduciaryLaw, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1418-29 (1998) (outlining the differences between the
fiduciary duties of a trustee of a charitable trust and those of a director of a not-for-profit
corporation). The fiduciary duty of a trustee of a charitable trust is based in trust law. See
James J. Fishman, Improving CharitableAccountability, 62 MD. L. REv. 218, 228 (2003)
(stating that although the term "fiduciary" is commonly associated with trust law, "it has much
broader use today"). The fiduciary duty of a director of a nonprofit corporation is based in
corporate law. Id. at 231. Because of this difference, the trustee of a charitable trust is generally
held to a standard of ordinary prudence, while the director of a nonprofit corporation is held to a
standard of gross negligence. See Malaro, RestrictedGifts, supra note 23, at 45 (describing the
ordinary prudence standard for trustees of a charitable trust). Malaro notes, however, that when
examining a fiduciary's performance of a museum's tax exempt purpose, courts and attorney
generals tend to apply stricter trust law standards. Id. at 49.
200. See Marie C. Malaro, Legal and EthicalFoundationsofMuseum Collecting Policies,
in LIBRARIES, MUSEUMS, AND ARcIVEs 69, 72 (Thomas A. Lipinski ed., 2002) (arguing that

under the fiduciary duty of loyalty museum professionals should make clear that their decisionmaking is guided by the best interest of the trust beneficiaries).
201. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 120, § 392 (stating that the trustee is bound by any
restriction on the power of alienation unless he secures release from the courts).
202. See generallyAtkinson, supra note 125, at 1115 (arguing that this conflict in duties
which underlies all cy pres actions requires evolution of the cy presdoctrine in a way that would
give charities greater autonomy).
203. Once again, I would like to acknowledge that the idea of liquidating museum assets
for operational expenses is highly controversial in the museum community. See supra note 15
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plenty, a trustee's duty of loyalty to the public beneficiaries requires that she be
able to make collection management decisions for the benefit of the
community. 204 When considering a deaccession in violation of the donor's terms,
museum trustees must consider whether the donor has substantiated her
commitment to the restriction by forgoing tax savings. As always, museum
trustees must consider the promises they have made to donors. When considering
a deaccession of a restricted item, however, trustees have the additional burden of
anticipating a court's determination under cy pres. Given that courts should be
more reluctant to reform the terms of a restricted gift when the donor has paid for
that restriction, trustees should likewise be even more committed to upholding the
terms of the agreement if at all possible. Because increased deference to donor's
intent in these circumstances may heighten future conflicts between the donor's
intent and the museum's public purpose, Malaro's argument that museums should
be professionally prohibited from accepting restricted gifts becomes more
potent. 20 5 Once again, navigation of these types of conflicts should be left to the
museum professionals whenever possible.
VI. Conclusion
Returning again to Springfield, if the IRS were to adopt this proposal and
Ms. Smith approached the museum with an offer of a restricted donation of
several paintings, the museum trustees would be in a better position to negotiate.
They could explain to Ms. Smith that removing the restriction on future
deacessioning would be in the best interest of both her and the museum. If they
determined that the paintings were appropriate for addition to the museum's
collection, the museum could assure Ms. Smith that they would honor her request
that the paintings not be deacessioned for so long as the paintings are in keeping
with the museum's collections policies, the good museum practice standard, and
the- particular needs of the museum. The museum could suggest that the gift
instrument contain precatory but not binding language regarding Ms. Smith's
wishes. Only if Ms. Smith still insisted on her restrictions, would the museum
have the difficult decision of whether to accept the art with the restriction on
alienation.
(discussing the ethical standards for use of deaccession proceeds). This Note merely argues that
tax valuation should be used in such a way as to allow museum professionals to make decisions
with increased knowledge and latitude within their own professional and ethical guidelines.
204. See generally Malaro, Deaccessioning,supra note 6 (discussing recent trends in the
museum profession regarding deaccessioning).
205. See Malaro, Restricted Gifts, supra note 23, at 41 (arguing that museums should not
accept gifts with restrictions on the right to sell).

